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The mechanism by Hart and Mas-Colell (1996) for NTU games is gen-
eralized so that a coalition structure among players is taken into account.
The new mechanism yields the Owen value for TU games with coalition
structure as well as the consistent value (Maschler and Owen 1989, 1992)
for NTU games with trivial coalition structure.
JEL Classiﬁcation: C71.
1 Introduction
Hart and Mas-Colell (1996) develop a bargaining mechanism which yields the
consistent value (Maschler and Owen 1989, 1992) for NTU games. First, a player
is randomly chosen in order to propose a payoﬀ. In case this proposal not be
accepted by all other players, the mechanism is played again under the same
conditions with probability δ ∈ [0,1). With probability 1 − δ, the proposer
leaves the game and the mechanism is repeated with the rest of the players.
Hart and Mas-Colell consider that the consistent value is a very appropriate
generalization for the Shapley (1953) value (used in TU games) to NTU games.
Other non-cooperative mechanisms which implement the Shapley value are,
for example, Gul (1989), Hart and Moore (1990), Winter (1994), Evans (1996),
Dasgupta and Chiu (1998), P´ erez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001) and Mutuswami,
P´ erez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2002). Navarro and Perea (2001) design a mech-
anism which implements the Myerson (1977) value, which is an extension of the
Shapley value to graph-restricted games.
Sometimes, however, players are associated in a priori coalitions. Owen
(1977) studies them in TU games. He proposes a value, known as the Owen
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1value, which generalizes the Shapley value for games with a coalition structure.
Later, Winter (1991) proposes a value, called the Game Coalition Structure
value, which is a generalization of the Harsanyi (1963) value NTU games and
the Owen value for TU games with a coalition structure.
A non-cooperative mechanism which implements the Owen value in the TU
case is given by Berganti˜ nos and Vidal-Puga (2002b).
In this paper, we develop a non-cooperative mechanism that takes into ac-
count the coalition structure and implements both the consistent value for NTU
games, and the Owen value for TU games.
The mechanism is as follows: First, a player is randomly chosen out of each
coalition and proposes a payoﬀ. Then, each proposal is voted by the rest of the
members of its own coalition. If one of them rejects the proposed payoﬀ,t h e
mechanism is either played again under the same conditions (probability ρ), or
the proposer leaves the game and the mechanism is repeated with the rest of
the players (probability 1 − ρ). If there is no rejection, the proposal of one of
the coalitions is randomly chosen. If this proposal is not accepted by all other
coalitions, the mechanism is played again under the same conditions (probability
ρ), or the entire proposing coalition leaves the game and the mechanism is
repeated with the rest of the players (probability 1 − ρ).
When the coalition structure is trivial (i.e., either there is a single grand
coalition or all the coalitions are singletons), this mechanism coincides with Hart
and Mas-Colell’s. Thus, the consistent value arises in equilibrium. Furthermore,
when the mechanism is applied to a transferable utility (TU) game with coalition
structure, the Owen value is implemented.
As for general NTU games with coalition structure, the arising equilibrium
payoﬀ is a recently studied solution concept: the consistent coalitional value
(Vidal-Puga and Berganti˜ nos, 2002a).
Assume we change the mechanism so that, before any proposal is set, all
the players know who is bound to be the proposer. This new mechanism also
coincides with Hart and Mas-Colell’s when the coalition structure is trivial.
However, for general NTU games with coalition structure, a new coalitional
value arises. We study this value in Section 4.
The structure of this paper is as follows: In Section 2 we give the deﬁnitions
and results used in the paper. In Section 3 we describe the coalitional mechanism
and give the main results: Theorem 11 deals with the existence of equilibria.
Theorem 12 proves the result for hyperplane games. Theorem 14 gives the
general convergence result. In Section 4, we present a slight modiﬁcation in the
coalitional mechanism. Finally, the proofs are located in the Appendix.
2D e ﬁnitions and previous results
Mainly, we follow the notation in Hart and Mas-Colell (1996). Let N =
{1,2,...,n} and 2N = {S : S ⊂ N}.G i v e n x,y ∈ RN,w es a yy ≤ x when












x ∈ RN : xi > 0,∀i
ª
.
A non transferable utility game,o rNTU game,i sap a i r( N,V)w h e r eN
is the set of players and V is a correspondence which assigns to each coalition
S ⊂ N, S 6= ∅ a subset V (S) ⊂ RS representing all the possible payoﬀst h a tt h e
members of S can obtain for themselves when play cooperatively. For S ⊂ N,
we maintain the notation V when refer to the application V restricted to S as
player set. For simplicity, we denote V (i) instead of V ({i}), S ∪ iinstead of
S ∪ {i} and N\i instead of N\{i}.
We impose the next conditions on the function V :
(A.1) For each S ⊂ N,t h es e tV (S) is closed, convex, comprehensive (i.e., if
x ∈ V (S)a n dy ∈ RS with y ≤ x,t h e ny ∈ V (S)) and upper bounded (i.e.,
for each x ∈ RS,t h es e t{y ∈ V (S):y ≥ x} is bounded).
(A.2) For each S ⊂ N, the boundary of V (S), which we denote by ∂V (S),
is smooth (this means that on each point of the boundary there exists
an unique outward ortonormal vector) and nonlevel (this means that the
outward vector on each point of ∂V (S) has its coordinates positive).
(A.3) Monotonicity:F o re a c hT ⊂ S, V (T) ×{ 0S\T} ⊂ V (S).
(A.4) Normalization:F o re a c hS ⊂ N,0 S belongs to V (S).









for some v :2 N → R with v (∅)=0 ,w es a yt h a t( N,V)i satransfer utility
game (or TU game) and it is represented by (N,v). We denote by TU(N)t h e




x ∈ RS : λS · x ≤ v(S)
ª
(1)
for some λS ∈ RS
++ and v :2 N → R,w es a yt h a t( N,V)i sahyperplane game.
Notice that every TU game is a hyperplane game with λ
i
S =1f o re v e r y
S ⊂ N and i ∈ S.
If rS ∈ ∂V (S) for all S ￿ N and rN ∈ V (N), we say that (N,V)i sapure
bargaining game.
We say that an NTU game is totally essential if rS ∈ V (S) for all S ⊂ N.
We say that an NTU game is zero-monotonic if V (i) × V (S\i) ⊂ V (S)f o ra l l
i ∈ S ⊂ N.
Given N,w ec a l lcoalition structure over N a partition of the player set, i.e.,
C = {C1,C 2,...,Cp} ⊂ 2N is a coalition structure if it satisﬁes
S
Cq∈C
Cq = N and
Cq ∩ Cr = ∅ when q 6= r.
3We denote by (N,V,C)an NTU game (N,V)with coalition structure C over
N.W e d e n o t e b y CNTU(N) the set of NTU games with coalition structure
over N. For coalitions S ⊂ N,w ed e n o t eb yCS the restriction of C to the
players in S (notice that this implies that CS may have less or the same number
of coalitions as C). We also denote C−i := CN\i.
Given Gas u b s e to fNTU(N)or CNTU(N), a value on G is a correspon-
dence which assigns to each element in G a subset of RN. When these subsets
are singletons we call the value a single value. A well known single value for TU
g a m e si st h eShapley value (Shapley, 1953). We denote by ϕN ∈ RN the Shap-
ley value of the TU game (N,v). For TU games with coalition structure, Owen
(1977) proposes a single value based on Shapley’s which takes into account the
coalition structure C. We call this value the Owen coalitional value,o rs i m p l y
the Owen value.W ed e n o t eb yφN ∈ RN the Owen value of the TU game with
coalition structure (N,v,C).
The consistent value for NTU games is introduced by Maschler and Owen
(1989, 1992). Let (N,V) be a hyperplane game deﬁned as in (1). Given i ∈ N,
the consistent value Ψ is deﬁned recursively as follows
Ψi
{i} = ri.
Assume we know Ψ
j
























For a general NTU game (N,V), Maschler and Owen (1992) take for each
coalition S ⊂ N a vector λS normal to the boundary of V (S). Let (N,V 0)b et h e
resulting hyperplane game, i.e. V 0(S)=
©




v(S,λS): =m a x{λS · x : x ∈ V (S)}.
Let Ψ =( ΨS)S⊂N with ΨS the (only) consistent value for (S,V 0). If Ψ is
af e a s i b l ep a y o ﬀ in (N,V) (i.e., ΨS ∈ V (S),∀S ⊂ N)t h e nΨN is a consistent
value for V .
The consistent value coincides with the Shapley value for TU games. Maschler
and Owen (1992) also show that the consistent value exists (it is not always
unique though) for any NTU game.
Let (N,V,C) be a hyperplane game with coalition structure. Vidal-Puga
and Berganti˜ nos (2002a) deﬁne recursively the consistent coalitional value as
follows. Given i ∈ Cq ∈ C:
Φi
{i} = ri
4Assume we know Φ
j
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(2)
Following the usual practice, we consider a payoﬀ conﬁguration as a set of
payoﬀs x =( xS)S⊂N with xS ∈ RS for all S ⊂ N.
The generalization of Φ to NTU games (not necessarily hyperplane games)
is done analogously to the consistent value. For an NTU game with coalition
structure (N,V,C), we take for each coalition S ⊂ N a normal vector λS to
the boundary of V (S). Let (N,V 0,C) be the resulting hyperplane game. Let
Φ := (ΦS)S⊂N for all S ⊂ N be the (unique) consistent coalitional payoﬀ
conﬁguration for V 0.I fΦ is a feasible payoﬀ conﬁguration for (N,V,C), then Φ
is a consistent coalitional payoﬀ conﬁguration for V .
Vidal-Puga and Berganti˜ nos (2002a) prove that the consistent coalitional
value exists for any NTU game (although it is not necessarily unique) and
give the following characterization. Given S ⊂ N player set, we denote by
C0
q := Cq ∩ S (when diﬀerent from ∅) the restriction of Cq in CS.T h e s e t
Φ =( ΦS)S⊂N is a consistent coalitional payoﬀ conﬁguration for (N,V,C)i fa n d
only if for each S ⊂ N there exists a vector λS ∈ RS
++, orthogonal to V (S),
such that:






















































S\i)f o re v e r yi ∈ C0
q ∈ CS.
Thus, (B.1), (B.2) and (B.3) generalize the characterization of balanced
contributions of the Owen value (Calvo, Lasaga and Winter, 1996) and the
consistent value (Hart and Mas-Colell, 1996).
3 The coalitional mechanism
In this section we describe the coalitional mechanism. This mechanism is a
modiﬁcation of the bargaining mechanism presented by Hart and Mas-Colell
(1996).
5In order to characterize the equilibria, we need to restrict the class of games.
This restriction is given by property (A.5) below. We claim that this property
is not too restrictive by showing that a signiﬁcative class of games (including
TU zero-monotonic games and pure bargaining games) satisﬁes it. Then, we
characterize the equilibria and show that there exits at least an equilibrium.
Finally, we prove that the equilibria yield the consistent coalitional value.
G i v e na nN T Ug a m e( N,V)a n dρ ∈ [0,1), Hart and Mas-Colell (1996)
deﬁne the following bargaining mechanism (associated to (N,V)a n dρ):
“ I ne a c hr o u n dt h e r ei sas e to factive players, and a proposer
i ∈ S.I nt h eﬁrst round S = N. The proposer is chosen at random
out of S, with all players in S being equally likely to be selected.
The proposer makes a proposal which is feasible, i.e. a payoﬀ vector
in V (S). If all the members of S accept it — they are asked in some
prespeciﬁed order — then the game ends with these payoﬀs. If it is
rejected by even one member of S, then we move to the next round
where, with probability ρ, the set of active players is again S and,
with probability 1−ρ, the proposer i drops out and the set of active
players becomes S\i. In the latter case the dropped i gets a ﬁnal
payoﬀ of 0.”
Hart and Mas-Colell (1996) prove that, for each hyperplane game, and for
each ρ ∈ [0,1), the bargaining mechanism implements the consistent value for
subgame perfect equilibria.
Furthermore, for a general NTU game (N,V), if for each S ⊂ N, aS(ρ)i s
the payoﬀ of a subgame perfect equilibrium for ρ ∈ [0,1) and aS is a limit point
of aS(ρ)a sρ → 1, then (aS)S⊂N is a consistent payoﬀ conﬁguration of the NTU
game (N,V).
Now we describe the coalitional bargaining mechanism formally. For each




q ∈ CS. For simplicity, we denote Γ = ΓN.
The coalitional bargaining mechanism associated to (N,V,C)a n dρ is deﬁned
as follows:
In each round there is a set S ⊂ N of active players. At ﬁrst
round, S = N. Each round has two stages. On the ﬁrst stage,
a proposer is randomly chosen out of each coalition. Namely, a
function γ ∈ ΓS is randomly chosen, being each γ e q u a l l yl i k e l yt o
be chosen. Players in C0






, but not of the proposers in other coalitions. The coalitions








the following way: Proposer γ (C0
1) proposes a feasible payoﬀ, i.e. a
vector in V (S). The members of C0
1\γ (C0
1)a r et h e na s k e di ns o m e
prespeciﬁed order. If one of them rejects the proposal, then we move
to next round where the set of active players is S with probability ρ
and S\γ (C0
1) with probability 1−ρ. In the latter case, player γ (C0
1)
6gets a ﬁnal payoﬀ of 0. If all of them accept the proposal, the game
moves to next coalition C0
2. Then, players of C0
2,u n a w a r eo fγ (C0
1)’s
identity and his proposal, proceed to repeat the process under the
same conditions, and so on. If all the proposals are accepted in each





































—t h e ya r ea s k e di ns o m ep r e s pe c i ﬁed order — then
the game ends with these payoﬀs. If it is rejected by at least one
member of S\C0
q, then we move to the next round where, with prob-
ability ρ, the set of active players is again S and, with probability
1 − ρ, the entire coalition C0
q drops out a n dt h es e to fa c t i v ep l a y -
ers becomes S\C0
q. In the latter case each member of the dropped
coalition C0
q gets a ﬁnal payoﬀ of 0.
Clearly, given any set of strategies, this mechanism ﬁnishes in a ﬁnite number
of rounds with probability 1.
Also note that the proposed payoﬀ of γ(C0
q) is independent on who are the
proposers in other coalitions.
Remark 1 The normalization given by property (A.4) does not aﬀect our re-
sults, although the bargaining mechanism must be changed as follows: The player
i ∈ N who drops out, receives an amount xi ∈ R such that xi ∈ V (i).T h i sxi
can be considered as a “penalty payoﬀ”. Also, the monotonic property must be
changed to V (T) ×
¡
xS\T¢
⊂ V (S) for each T ⊂ S.
The coalitional bargaining mechanism may be interpreted as the mechanism
by Hart and Mas-Colell played on two stages, one of them by the coalitions
and another by the players inside the same coalition. On the second stage, the
coalitions play Hart and Mas-Colell’s mechanism. This means that a coalition
is randomly chosen to propose a payoﬀ. The disagreement to this payoﬀ by at
least one of the other coalitions puts the whole proposing coalition in jeopardy.
In order to decide the proposals, the members of each coalition play Hart and
Mas-Colell’s mechanism on a ﬁrst stage. Thus, a player is randomly chosen
inside each coalition and proposes a feasible payoﬀ.O n l yi fa l lt h er e s to ft h e
members of his coalition agree to this payoﬀ, the proposal goes on to the second
stage. Otherwise the proposer is in jeopardy. However, once the proposal is
presented on the second stage, it is backed by the whole proposing coalition, so
that its rejection may imply the whole coalition leaves the game.
In our study, as in Hart and Mas-Colell’s, we consider stationary subgame
perfect equilibria. In this context, an equilibrium is stationary if the players
strategies depend only on the set S of active players. It does not depend,
however, on the previous history nor the number of played rounds.
7We also assume, as Hart and Mas-Colell, that players break ties in favor
of quick termination of the game. We must note that this assumption is not
needed in Hart and Mas-Colell’s model. However, Example 15 shows that we
cannot avoid it in our coalitional mechanism.
From now on, when we say equilibrium, we mean stationary subgame perfect
equilibrium satisfying this tie-breaking rule.
Given a set of stationary strategies, let S denote the set of active players.
We denote by a(S,i) ∈ V (S)thepayoﬀ proposed by i ∈ C0
q ∈ CS when the
set of proposers is determined by some γ ∈ ΓS with γ(C0
q)=i.W ea l s od e ﬁne,













Since V (S) is a convex set and each a(S,γ(C0
q)) belongs to V (S), their
average also belongs to V (S). When all the proposals are accepted, a(S)γ is the
expected ﬁnal payoﬀ when γ determines the set of proposers (or representatives).
Given i ∈ C0
q ∈ CS,l e tΓS,i (Γi = ΓN,i) be the subset of functions γ ∈ ΓS such
that γ(C0
q)=i.N o t i c et h a t|ΓS| = |ΓS,i|
¯ ¯C0
q
¯ ¯ for all i ∈ C0












r)) ∈ V (S)
is the expected ﬁnal payoﬀ when all the proposals are accepted and player i is







a(S)γ ∈ V (S)
as the expected ﬁnal payoﬀ when all the proposals are accepted. Given C0
q ∈ CS,























Proposition 1 in Hart and Mas-Colell (1996) characterizes the proposals
corresponding to an equilibrium by (1) a(S,i) ∈ ∂V (S)a n d( 2 )a(S,i)
j =
δa(S)
j +( 1− ρ)a(S\i)
j.
8We now introduce some properties which generalize (1) and (2) in Hart and
Mas-Colell (1996) to games with coalition structure.
We consider the following properties:
(C.1) a(S,i) ∈ ∂V (S)for every i ∈ N;
(C.2) a(S|i)j = ρa(S)j +( 1− ρ)a(S\i)j for every i,j ∈ C0
q ∈ CS with j 6= i;













(C.3) a(S,i)j = ρa(S)j +( 1− ρ)a(S\C0
q)j for every i ∈ C0
q ∈ CS, j/ ∈ C0
q.
Of course (C.1) coincides with Property (1) of Proposition 1 in Hart and
Mas-Colell (1996). Property (2) is split in two properties: (C.2) or (C.2’), and
(C.3) following usual practice in the literature on games with coalition structure.
Proposition 2 If (C.3) holds, then (C.2) is equivalent to (C.2’).
The proof of Proposition 2 is in the Appendix.
Proposition 3 If (C.3) holds, then a(S)
j = a(S|i)




The proof of Proposition 3 is in the Appendix.
Proposition 4 Let (N,V,C) be a hyperplane game with coalition structure. As-




S⊂N satisﬁes (C.1), (C.2) and (C.3). Then,
(a(S))S⊂N is the consistent coalitional value for the game (N,V,C).
The proof of Proposition 4 is located in the Appendix.
By Proposition 2, Proposition 4 also holds if we replace (C.2) by (C.2’).
However, in order to characterize the equilibria, properties (C.1), (C.2) and
(C.3) are not enough in general. Thus, we impose an additional condition to





S⊂N set of proposals, we deﬁne the vector c(S,i) ∈ RS


























¢j for all j ∈ S\C0
q.
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(4)
We consider the following property:
9(A.5) For any (a(S,i))S⊂N,i∈S set of proposals satisfying (C.1), (C.2) and
(C.3), we have that, for every S ⊂ N, i ∈ C
0
q ∈ CS,t h ev e c t o rc(S,i)
belongs to V (S).
This property is not satisﬁed by general NTU games, as next example shows:
Example 5 Let (N,V,C) be such that N = {1,2,3}, C = {{1,2},{3}} and V
be deﬁned as follows,
V (i)=0− R+, i =1 ,2,3;









V (N)={(x1,x 2,x 3):x1 + x2 + x3 ≤ 1}.
It can be easily checked that this game is superadditive1. Furthermore, if


















12ρ2 − 80ρ +8 0
,0
¶
/ ∈ V (N).
Nevertheless, next proposition shows that several interesting subclasses of
NTU games satisfy (A.5).
Proposition 6 Property (A.5) is satisﬁed by the next class of games,
• zero-monotonic TU games;
• totally essential three-player hyperplane2 games; and
• pure bargaining games.
The proof of Proposition 6 is located in the Appendix.
Proposition 7 The proposals in any equilibrium of an NTU game satisfying
(A.5) are characterized by (C.1), (C.2) and (C.3). Moreover, all the proposals
are accepted and a(S) ≥ 0S for all S ⊂ N.
The proof of Proposition 7 is located in the Appendix.
Remark 8 There is a subtle diﬀerence between the result given by Proposition
7 and Proposition 1 in Hart and Mas-Colell (1996). In Hart and Mas-Colell’s
model, the proposals a(S,i) are nonnegative. In our model, the proposals do
not need to be nonnegative, as it can be checked in Example 16. However, their
(weighted) average a(S) is always nonnegative in equilibrium.
1It is not smooth, but we can make it smooth by a small modiﬁcation which does not
change our result.
2It is enough that the game coincides with a hyperplane game in V (S)∩RS
+ for all S ⊂ N.
10Now, we see two important corollaries of Proposition 7.
Corollary 9 Let (N,V,C) be an NTU game with coalition structure satisfying
(A.5). Then, a player’s expected payoﬀ in equilibrium is independent on who is
the proposer in other coalitions. Namely:
a(S)j = a(S|i)j ∀i ∈ C0
q ∈ CS;j/ ∈ C0
q.
The proof of Corollary 9 is immediate from Proposition 3 and Proposition
7.
Hart and Mas-Colell say: “if ρ is close to 1— i.e., the ‘cost of delay’ is low
— then there is little dispersion among individual proposals: all the a(N,i)
constitute3 small deviations of a(N). This implies, ﬁrst, that a(N) is almost
Pareto optimal (since the a(N,i) are Pareto optimal). And second, that there is
no substantial advantage or disadvantage to being the proposer;t h e‘ ﬁrst-mover’
eﬀect vanishes.”
Next corollary states that the coalitional bargaining mechanism behaves in
t h es a m ew a y .
Corollary 10 There exists M ∈ R such that
¯ ¯a(N,i)j − a(N)j¯ ¯ <M(1−ρ) for
all i,j ∈ N.
The proof of Corollary 10 is in the Appendix.
In next theorem we prove the existence of equilibria.
Theorem 11 Let (N,V,C) an NTU game with coalition structure satisfying
(A.5). Then, for each ρ ∈ [0,1), there exists an equilibrium.
The proof of Theorem 11 is located in the Appendix.
Next results characterize the equilibrium payoﬀs.
Theorem 12 Let (N,V,C) be a hyperplane game with coalition structure sat-
isfying (A.5). Then, for each ρ ∈ [0,1), there exists a unique equilibrium.
Furthermore, the equilibrium payoﬀ conﬁguration equals the unique consistent
coalitional payoﬀ conﬁguration of (N,V,C).
Theorem 12 is an immediate consequence of Proposition 4, Proposition 7
and Theorem 11.
Corollary 13 The coalitional mechanism, when applied to zero-monotonic TU
games, implements the Owen value.
Since the consistent coalitional value coincides with the Owen value in TU
games with coalition structure, Corollary 13 is an immediate consequence of
Proposition 6 and Theorem 12.
Notice that the coalitional bargaining mechanism implements the Shapley
value for zero-monotonic games because the Shapley value coincides with the
Owen value when the coalition structure is trivial.
3Hart and Mas-Colell denote a(N,i)a n da(N)a saN,i and aN, respectively.
11Theorem 14 Let (N,V,C) be an NTU game with coalition structure satisfying
(A.5). If aρ := (aρ(S))S⊂N is an equilibrium payoﬀ conﬁguration for each ρ
and a is the limit of aρ when ρ → 1,t h e na is a consistent coalitional payoﬀ
conﬁguration of (N,V,C).
The proof of Theorem 14 is located in the Appendix.
If we do not assume the tie-breaking rule, the consistent coalitional value is
still an equilibrium payoﬀ. However, there can be other equilibria which do not
yield the consistent coalitional value, as next example shows.
Example 15 Consider (N,v,C), where N = {1,2,3,4}, C = {C1,C 2}, C1 =
{1,2}, C2 = {3,4}. Moreover, v is the characteristic function associated to the
weighted majority game where the quota is 3 and the weights are 1, 1, 1, and
2 respectively. This means that v(S)=1if and only if S contains some of the
following subsets: {1,2,3}, {1,4}, {2,4},o r{3,4}.



























































First, we describe the strategies of players 1 and 2. When one of them






.M o r e o v e r ,
players 1 and 2 accept an oﬀer if and only if it oﬀers them something positive.
In the subgame obtained after γ (C1) drops out of the game the strategy of player
j coincides with the strategy with ΦN\γ(C1) as payoﬀ outcome. In the subgame
obtained after C2 drops out of the game the strategy of players 1 and 2 coincides
with the strategy with ΦN\C2 as payoﬀ outcome.
We now describe the strategies of players 3 and 4. In the subgame obtained
after the oﬀer of γ (C1) is accepted, the strategies of players 3 and 4 coincide
with the strategies with ΦN as payoﬀ outcome. In the subgame obtained after
γ (C1) drops out the game, the strategies of players 3 and 4 coincide with the
strategies with ΦN\γ(C1) as payoﬀ outcome. In the subgame obtained after C1
drops out the game, the strategies of players 3 and 4 coincide with the strategies
with ΦN\C1 as payoﬀ outcome.
It is not diﬃcult to check that these strategies are an equilibrium.
12According to these strategies, the oﬀer of player γ (C1) is rejected, which
means that player γ (C1) obtains a ﬁnal payoﬀ of 0. Then, players of N \γ (C1)








4A m o d i ﬁcation in the model
In this section we present a slight modiﬁcation of the coalitional bargaining
mechanism deﬁned previously. The new mechanism is simpler. Unfortunately,
when we restrict it to TU games with coalition structure, the payoﬀso ft h e
equilibria can be diﬀerent from the Owen value.
We assume that a single proposer is chosen, and his proposal is voted ﬁrst
by the members of his own coalition and then by the members of the other
coalitions.
Formally,
In each round there is a set S ⊂ N of active players. At ﬁrst round,
S = N. First, a coalition C0
q out of CS is randomly chosen, being each
coalition equally likely to be chosen. Then, a proposer is randomly
chosen out of C0
q, being each player equally likely to be chosen. We
denote by q∗ this proposer. Player q∗ proposes a feasible payoﬀ, i.e.
a vector in V (S). The members of S\q∗ are then asked in some
prespeciﬁed order, but beginning with the members of C0
q\q∗.I fo n e
of the members of C0
q\q∗ rejects the proposal, then we move to the
next round where the set of active players is S with probability ρ
and S\q∗ with probability 1 − ρ. In the latter case, player q∗ gets
a ﬁnal payoﬀ of 0. If the oﬀer is accepted by all the members of
C0
q\q∗ a n dr e j e c t e db ya tl e a s to n em e m b e ro fS\C0
q,t h e nw em o v e
to the next round where, with probability ρ,t h es e to fa c t i v ep l a y e r s
is again S and, with probability 1 − ρ, the entire coalition C0
q drops
out and the set of active players becomes S\C0
q. In the latter case
each member of the dropped coalition C0
q gets a ﬁnal payoﬀ of 0. If
all the members of S\q∗ accept the proposal, then the game ends
with these payoﬀs.
This mechanism also generalizes Hart and Mas-Colell’s bargaining mecha-
nism.
The main diﬀerence between the bargaining coalitional mechanism and this
new mechanism is that, in the latter, when the players of a coalition accept
the proposal of one of their members, they know that this proposal is due to
be voted by the other coalitions. In the ﬁrst mechanism, however, players only
know this proposal would have a chance to be voted by the other coalitions.
This slight diﬀerence is not innocuous and aﬀects in an important way to
the behavior of agents, as we can see in the following example:
13Example 16 Consider (N,v,C), where N = {1,2,3}, C = {C1,C 2}, C1 =
{1,2}, C2 = {3}.M o r e o v e r , v is the characteristic function associated to the
weighted majority game where the quota is 3 and the weights are 2, 1, and 1
respectively. This means that v(S)=1if and only if S contains {1,2} or {1,3}.
Otherwise, v(S)=0 .












, since this is the payoﬀ players in C1 would get in





f o ras i m i l a rr e a s o n .P l a y e r





, and player 2 accepts! Notice that, by
rejecting, player 2 gets 0, and by accepting, his ﬁnal payoﬀ is 1
2 if the r.p. is
player 3,a n d−1
2 if the r.p. is player 1.I ne x p e c t e dt e r m s ,p l a y e r2 gets 0.











































Assume now they play the new mechanism. Again, both player 3 and 2





should any of them be the proposer. In this case,
however, player 1 cannot expect player 2 to accept a negative payoﬀ.P l a y e r






, i.e. diﬀerent from the Owen value.
We proceed now to characterize the equilibria in this new mechanism. To
do so, for each S ⊂ N, we keep the notation a(S,i) for the proposal made by
player i if he is chosen as proposer.
Given a hyperplane game (N,V,C), we inductively deﬁne the following so-
lution concept. For all i ∈ Cq ∈ C:
χi
{i} = ri
Assume we know χ
j



















































It is straightforward to prove that χN ∈ ∂V (N).
We can also generalize χ to any NTU game analogously to Ψ and Φ — i.e.
by means of supporting hyperplanes.
Let a(S)b ed e ﬁned as in (3). We consider next property:
14(C.4) a(S,i)
j = ρa(S)
j +( 1− ρ)a(S\i)
j for every i,j ∈ C0
q ∈ CS with j 6= i.
Proposition 17 Let (N,V,C) be a hyperplane game with coalition structure.




S⊂N for the new mechanism satisﬁes
(C.1), (C.3), and (C.4). Then, (a(S))S⊂N =( χS)S⊂N.
The proof of Proposition 17 is in the Appendix.
Given (a(S,i))S⊂N,i∈S set of proposals, we deﬁne the vector d(S,i) ∈ RS












¢j for all j ∈ S\C0
q
Again, we consider a new property:
(A.6) For any (a(S,i))S⊂N,i∈S set of proposals satisfying (C.1), (C.3), and
(C.4), we have that, for every S ⊂ N, i ∈ C
0
q ∈ CS,t h ev e c t o rd(S,i)
belongs to V (S).
The proofs of Proposition 18, Theorem 19, Theorem 20 and Theorem 21 are
analogous to those of Proposition 7, Theorem 11, Theorem 12 and Theorem 14,
respectively, and we omit them.
Proposition 18 The proposals in any equilibrium of the new mechanism of
an NTU game satisfying (A.6) are characterized by (C.1), (C.3), and (C.4).
Moreover, all the proposals are accepted and a(S) ≥ 0S for all S ⊂ N.
Notice the diﬀerences between the characterizations in both models. In
both mechanisms, the proposals are Pareto eﬃcient (property (C.1)) and satisfy
(C.3). However, in the new mechanism, property (C.2) is replaced by (C.4).
Now, the members of the proposer’s coalition know that the proposal would
also be proposed to the other coalitions should they accept it.
Theorem 19 Let (N,V,C) be an NTU game satisfying (A.6). Then, for each
ρ ∈ [0,1), there exists an equilibrium.
Theorem 20 Let (N,V,C) be a hyperplane game satisfying (A.6). Then, for
each ρ ∈ [0,1), there exists a unique equilibrium. Furthermore, the equilibrium
payoﬀ conﬁguration equals (χS)S⊂N.
Theorem 21 Let (N,V,C) be an NTU game with coalition structure satisfying
(A.6). If aρ := (aρ(S))S⊂N is an equilibrium payoﬀ conﬁguration for the new
mechanism for each ρ and a is the limit of aρ when ρ → 1,t h e na =( χS)S⊂N.
We must note that, however χ does not generalize the Owen value for TU
games, it does generalize the consistent value for NTU games with trivial coali-
tion structure.
155A p p e n d i x
5.1 Proof of Proposition 2
Fix i,j ∈ C0



















































































We ﬁrst prove that, under (C.3), (C.2) implies (C.2’).
By (C.3), we know a(S,γ(C0
r))j = ρa(S)j+(1−ρ)a(S\C0






















ρa(S)j +( 1− ρ)a(S\C0
r)j¤
by (C.2), we know a(S|i)j = ρa(S)j +( 1− ρ)a(S\i)j,s o :
= |CS|
£







ρa(S)j +( 1− ρ)a(S\C0
r)j¤











which is condition (C.2’).










































































































































a(S)j +( 1− ρ)a(S\i)j
= ρa(S)j +( 1− ρ)a(S\i)j.
which is condition (C.2).￿
5.2 Proof of Proposition 3
We ﬁrst prove that a(S|i)j = a(S|k)j,∀i,k ∈ C0























































17by (C.3), a(S,i)j = ρa(S)j +( 1− ρ)a(S\C0


































5.3 Proof of Proposition 4
We proceed by induction. The case of one player is trivial. Assume the re-
sult is true for hyperplane games with less than n players. Assume V (N)= ©
x ∈ RN : λ · x ≤ v (N)
ª
for some λ ∈ RN
++.
By Berganti˜ nos and Vidal-Puga (2002), it is enough to prove that a(N)
satisﬁes (B.1), (B.2), and (B.3).









a(N,i). Moreover, λ · a(N,i)=
v (N)f o re a c hi ∈ N because a(N,i) ∈ ∂V (N)b y( C . 1 ) .T h e n ,λ·a(N)=v(N)
and hence a(N)s a t i s ﬁes (B.1).















































































































ρa(N)j +( 1− ρ)a(N\Cr)j¤

.






































ρa(N)j +( 1− ρ)a(N\Cr)j¤

.



























































































































































































Which is precisely property (B.2) when S = N and λN = λ.





















a(S,γ (Cr)) and a(N,γ (Cr)) ∈ ∂V (N)f o r





j = v(N). Then,
|Cq|λ










































































ρa(N)i +( 1− ρ)a(N\j)i¤



























21This ﬁrst term is |Cq|λ
ia(N)i. So, the rest of terms must equal zero. Dividing






























Which is property (B.3) when S = N and λN = λ.￿
5.4 Proof of Proposition 6
5.4.1 Zero-monotonic TU games
By Proposition 4, we know that a(S)=φS for all S ⊂ N.
We use next result, proved by Berganti˜ nos and Vidal-Puga (2001). Given
at r i p l e( N,v,C) such that (N,v) is a zero-monotonic TU game, S ⊂ N and
i ∈ C0
















































































































































































































which means that (A.5) holds for (N,v,C).￿
5.4.2 Essential three-player hyperplane games
By Proposition 4, we know that a(S)=ΦS for all S ⊂ N.
We consider i = 1 and the coalition structure C = {{1,2},{3}}. The other
possibilities are equivalent or trivial.


























































































































































































































































12r2 ≤ v(12). Thus, the
expression given by (8) is not more than
−λ
1
Nr1 + v(N) ≤ v(N).
￿
5.4.3 Pure bargaining games
We ﬁrst prove by induction that, for S ￿ N, a(S)=rS.B y( C . 1 ) ,t h er e s u l t
is trivial for n = 1. Assume that a(T)=rT for all T ￿ S. Then, given
i ∈ C0
q ∈ CS :
By (C.2’), a(S,i)
j = ρa(S)















j +( 1− ρ)rj for all j ∈ S\C0
q.
Thus, a(S,i)c o i n c i d ew i t hρa(S)+(1− ρ)r in all coordinates but (at most)
the ith. Moreover, both a(S)a n dr belong to V (S), and so ρa(S)+( 1− ρ)r
does. Thus, by (C.1), a(S,i)
i ≥ ρa(S)
i +( 1− ρ)ri. By averaging over i,w e
have a(S)
i ≥ ρa(S)
i+(1− ρ)ri and thus a(S)
i ≥ ri.W eh a v et h e na(S) ≥ rS.








































−(|C| − 1)ri,r S\i
´
.
By (A.4), ri ≥ 0 and thus c(S,i) ≤
¡
0,rS\i¢




By comprehensiveness, c(S,i) ∈ V (S).￿
245.5 Proof of Proposition 7
We proceed by induction. The result holds trivially when n = 1. Assume that
it is true when there are at most n − 1p l a y e r s .
Assume we are in an equilibrium. By induction hypothesis,the expected
payoﬀ for the players in S ￿ N in any equilibrium with S as set of active
players is a(S). Let bN ∈ RN be the expected payoﬀ when N is the set of active
players. We must prove that (C.1), (C.2), and (C.3) hold for S = N.
We proceed by a series of Claims:
Claim (A):G i v e nCq ∈ C on the second stage, assume the pro-
posers are determined by γ ∈ Γ and the r.p. is γ(Cq). Then, all




i for every i ∈ N\Cq. Otherwise, the proposal is
rejected.
Notice that, in the case of rejection on the second stage, the expected payoﬀ
of a player i ∈ N\Cq is, by induction hypothesis, ρbi
N +( 1− ρ)a(N\Cq)i.
Suppose we reach the second stage. We assume without loss of generality
that Cq = {1,2,...,cq} and (cq +1 ,...,n)is the order in which the players in
N\Cq are asked.
If the game reaches player n, i.e., there has been no previous rejection, his
optimal strategy involves accepting the proposal if a(N,γ (Cq))
n is equal (by
the tie-breaking rule) or higher than ρbn
N +( 1− ρ)a(N\Cq)n and rejecting it
if it is lower than ρbn
N +( 1− ρ)a(N\Cq)n.P l a y e r n − 1 ∈ N\Cq, anticipates
reaction of player n.H e n c e , i f a(N,γ (Cq))n ≥ ρbn
N +( 1− ρ)a(N\Cq)n and
a(N,γ (Cq))n−1 ≥ ρb
n−1
N +( 1− ρ)a(N\Cq)n−1, and the game reaches player
n − 1, he accepts the proposal. If a(N,1)n < ρbn
N +( 1− ρ)a(N\Cq)n,p l a y e r
n − 1i si n d i ﬀerent between accepting or rejecting the proposal, since he knows
player n is bound to reject the proposal should the game reach him. In any
case, the proposal is rejected. By going backwards, we prove the result for all
players in N\Cq on the second stage.
Claim (B):L e tγ ∈ Γ be the correspondence which determines the
set of proposers on the ﬁrst stage. Given any Cq ∈ C,a s s u m ea l l
the coalitions which choose representative after Cq are bound to
choose their proposer as representative should the game reach them.
Given i ∈ Cq,l e tbN,i be the expected ﬁnal payoﬀ in equilibrium
restricted to i be a representative. Then, all players in Cq\γ(Cq)




N +(1− ρ)a(N\γ (Cq))
j for
every j ∈ Cq\γ(Cq). Otherwise, the proposal is rejected.
Notice that, under our hypothesis, in the case of rejection of γ (Cq)’s proposal




We assume without loss of generality that Cq = {1,...,cq}, γ(Cq)=1a n d
players in Cq\1 are asked in the order (2,...,cq).
25If the game reaches player cq, i.e., there has been no previous rejection,



















N +( 1− ρ)a(N\1)cq−1,a n d





(1 − ρ)a(N\1)cq,p l a y e rcq − 1i si n d i ﬀerent between accepting or rejecting the
proposal, since he knows player cq is bound to reject the proposal should the
game reach him. In any case, the proposal is rejected. By going backwards, we
prove the result for all players in Cq\1o nt h eﬁrst stage.
Claim (C):A l lt h eo ﬀers on the ﬁrst stage are accepted.
Assume coalitions play the ﬁrst stage in the order (C1,C 2,...,Cp)a n dt h a t
the mechanism reaches coalition Cp; i.e. there has been no previous rejection.




We can assume without loss of generality that Cp = {1,2,...,cp}, γ (Cp)=1
and players are asked in the order (2,...,cp).
We deﬁne a new proposal a(N,1) for player 1 as follows. Let c(N,1) be
deﬁn e da si n( 4 ) . B y( A . 5 )a n di n d u c t i o nh y p o t h e s i s ,c(N,1) ∈ V (N). By
convexity, ρbN +( 1− ρ)c(N,1) ∈ V (N). Let a(N,1) = ρbN +( 1− ρ)c(N,1).
Assume the mechanism reaches cp; i.e. has not been previous rejection.





If cp accepts a(N,1) and the proposal chosen in the second stage is from
Cr 6= Cq,t h e ncp can obtain ρb
cp
N +( 1− ρ)a(N\Cr)
cp by rejecting it. If the
proposal chosen in the second stage is from Cq, then it is accepted (by Claim
(A)).

















































N +( 1− ρ)a(N\1)
cp .
Thus, by the tie-breaking rule, it is optimal for cp to accept a(N,1). By
going backwards, we can prove that it is optimal for cp−1,c p−2,...,2t oa c c e p t







































So, by the tie-breaking rule, it is optimal for 1 to change his proposal to
a(N,1). This contradiction proves that there are not proposals rejected on the
ﬁrst stage in Cp. By going backwards, we prove that no proposal is rejected on
the ﬁrst stage in Cp−1,...,C 1.
Claim (D):A l lt h eo ﬀers on the second stage are accepted.
Suppose the proposal of γ (Cq) is rejected on the second stage. Then, the
ﬁnal payoﬀ for the members of Cq (including γ (Cq)) is 0 with probability 1
|C| > 0.




N +( 1− ρ)a(N\γ (Cq))
j for all









By convexity and monotonicity, a(N,γ (Cq)) ∈ V (N). By Claim (A),t h i s
proposal is bound to be accepted should γ (Cq) be the r.p. on the second stage.
However, bN,γ(Cq) remains unaltered. So, by Claim (B), a(N,γ (Cq)) is also
accepted on the ﬁrst stage. Moreover, the expected ﬁnal payoﬀ for γ (Cq)a l s o
remains the same. By the tie-breaking rule, we are not in an equilibrium. This
contradiction proves that the proposals on the second stage are always accepted.
Since all the proposals are accepted, we can assure that bN = a(N)a n d
bN,i = a(N|i) for all i ∈ N.
We show now (C.1), (C.2), and (C.3) hold.
Suppose (C.1) does not hold, i.e., there exists a player i ∈ Cq such that
a(N,i) is not Pareto optimal. Thus, a(N,i) belongs to the interior of V (N); so,




Notice that, since the proposal a(N,i)o fp l a y e ri is accepted, by Claim (B)
— together with Claim (C) and Claim (D) — we know that a(N|i)j ≥ ρb
j
N +
(1 − ρ)a(N\i)j for every j ∈ Cq\i and, by Claim (A), a(N,i)j ≥ ρb
j
N +( 1−
ρ)a(N\Cq)j for every j ∈ N\Cq.S o dj ≥ ρb
j
N +( 1− ρ)a(N\i)j for every
j ∈ Cq\iand dj ≥ ρb
j
N +( 1− ρ)a(N\Cq)j for every j ∈ N\Cq.B yClaim (A)
27and Claim (B),i fp l a y e ri changes his proposal to d, it is bound to be accepted
and his expected ﬁnal payoﬀ improves by
ε
|C||Cq|
> 0. This contradiction proves
(C.1).
Suppose (C.2) does not hold. Let j0 ∈ Cq\ibe a player such that a(N|i)j0 =
ρa(N)
j0 +( 1− ρ)a(N\i)j0 + α with α 6=0 .B yClaim (B), α > 0.








+( ε,0N\i) belongs to V (N). Suppose player i changes
his proposal to b a(N,i). The new value b a(N|i)s a t i s ﬁes:




b a(N|i)j0 = a(N|i)j0 − α = ρb
j0
N +( 1− ρ)a(N\i)j0;
b a(N|i)j = a(N|i)j ≥ ρb
j
N +( 1− ρ)a(N\i)j for all j ∈ Cq\{i,j0};
b a(N,i)j =a(N,i)j ≥ ρb
j
N +( 1− ρ)a(N\Cq)j for all j ∈ N\Cq.
So, by Claim (A) and Claim (B),t h en e wp r o p o s a lo fp l a y e ri is due to be





The reasoning for (C.3) is similar to (C.2) and we omit it.
It remains to show that a(N) ≥ 0. Notice that player i ∈ N can guarantee a
payoﬀ of at least 0 by proposing always 0N and accepting only proposals which
give him a nonnegative expected payoﬀ.T h u s ,a(N) ≥ 0.
Conversely, we show that proposals (a(S,i))i∈S⊂N satisfying (C.1), (C.2) and
(C.3) can be supported as an equilibrium.
First, we prove that a(S) ≥ 0 for all S ⊂ N. By induction hypothesis, this
is true for any S ￿ N.G i v e ni ∈ Cq ∈ C,b y( A . 5 ) ,w eh a v ec(N,i) ∈ V (N).
By convexity, e c(N,i): =ρa(N)+( 1− ρ)c(N,i) ∈ V (N).
Since a(N,i)s a t i s ﬁes (C.2) and (C.3), by Proposition 2, a(N,i) also satisﬁes
(C.2’). Then, a(N,i)
N\i = e c(N,i)
N\i.W en o wc o n c l u d et h a ta(N,i) ≥ e c(N,i)
because a(N,i) ∈ ∂V (N)a n de c(N,i) ∈ V (N). Hence,
a(N,i)
i ≥ e c(N,i)
i = ρa(N)








































































Furthermore, by (C.2) and a(N\j) ≥ 0, we have a(N|j)
i ≥ ρa(N)
i for all





















We now follow the same reasoning by Hart and Mas-Colell to verify that
the strategies corresponding to these proposals form an equilibrium. By the
induction hypothesis, this is so in any subgame after a player (or coalition) has
dropped out. Fix a player i ∈ Cq. I fh er e j e c t st h ep r o p o s a lf r o map r o p o s e r
j ∈ Cq\i, his expected ﬁnal payoﬀ is ρa(N)i +( 1− ρ)a(N\j)i. If he rejects
the proposal from a r.p. j ∈ Cr 6= Cq, his expected ﬁnal payoﬀ is ρa(N)i +
(1 − ρ)a(N\Cr)i. In any case, his expected ﬁnal payoﬀ i st h es a m ea st h a tt h e
o t h e rp l a y e ri so ﬀering. Since the rest of the players accept the proposal, he
does not improve his expected ﬁnal payoﬀ by rejecting it. If the proposer is
player i himself, the strategies of the other players do not allow him to decrease
his proposal to any of them (since it would be rejected by Claim (A) and
Claim (B)). Moreover, increasing one or more of his oﬀers to the other players
keeping the rest unaltered implies his own payment decreases (by (C.1) and
nonlevelness). Finally, by oﬀering an unacceptable proposal, he may be dropped
out and his expected ﬁnal payment becomes 0, which does not improve his ﬁnal
payoﬀ (because a(N|i)
i ≥ 0). Thus, the proposals do form an equilibrium.￿
5.6 Proof of Corollary 10
Fix i ∈ Cq ∈ C.G i v e nj ∈ N\Cq,b y( C . 3 ) :
¯ ¯a(N,i)j − a(N)j¯ ¯ =
¯ ¯ρa(N)j +( 1− ρ)a(N\Cq)j − a(N)j¯ ¯ =( 1− ρ)
¯ ¯a(N\Cq)j − a(N)j¯ ¯.
29So, we take M1 ∈ Ras the maximum of the set:
©¯ ¯a(N\Cq)j − a(N)j¯ ¯ : Cq ∈ C,j∈ N\Cq
ª
.
This maximum exists because a(S) ≥ 0 for all S ⊂ N.4
We have then
¯ ¯a(N,i)j − a(N)j¯ ¯ ≤ M1(1 − ρ) for all j ∈ N\Cq.
Given j ∈ Cq\i,b y( C . 2 ’ ) :
¯ ¯a(N,i)j − a(N)j¯ ¯
=
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯








¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
=( 1 − ρ)





¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯









¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯




This maximum exists because a(S) ≥ 0 for all S ⊂ N.
We have then
¯ ¯a(N,i)j − a(N)j¯ ¯ ≤ M2(1 − ρ).
We now study



































4This set may be no ﬁnite, because we are considering the proposals for any ρ.
30So:
¯ ¯a(N,i)i − a(N)i¯ ¯
= |C||Cq|






















¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
= |C||Cq|

















































M2 = |Cq|(|C| − 1)M1 +( |Cq| − 1)M2.
So, we take M =m a x{|Cq|(|C| − 1)M1 +( |Cq| − 1)M2 : Cq ∈ C}.￿
5.7 Proof of Theorem 11
By Proposition 7, we only need to prove that there exist proposals satisfying
( C . 1 ) ,( C . 2 ) ,a n d( C . 3 ) . W ep r o c e e db yi n d u c t i o no nt h en u m b e ro fp l a y e r s .
Clearly, the result is true for n = 1. Assume now that we have a(S,i)foreach
S ⊂ N and each i ∈ S satisfying (C.1), (C.2) and (C.3) when S ￿ N.B y
Proposition 7, a(S) ≥ 0 for all S ￿ N.
For each i ∈ Cq ∈ C, by property (A.5), the vector c(N,i) belongs to V (N).




all j ∈ N\i.W ed e ﬁne:
β1 =m i n {ai (S):i ∈ S ￿ N} ∈ R
β2 =m i n
©
zi
j : i,j ∈ N
ª
∈ R
β =m i n ( β1,β2) ∈ R
K = {x ∈ V (N):x ≥ (β,...,β)}.
This set K is nonempty (zi ∈ K for all i ∈ N), closed (because V (N)is
closed) and bounded (by (A.1)). Thus, K is a compact set. Furthermore, K is
convex (because V (N)isconvex).
We deﬁne n functions αi : K → K as follows. Given i ∈ Cq ∈ C, α
j
i(x): =
ρxj +( 1− ρ)c(N,i)
j for each j ∈ N\i and αi
i (x)i sd e ﬁn e di ns u c haw a yt h a t
αi (x) ∈ ∂V (N).
These functions are well deﬁned, because yi := ρx +( 1− ρ)zi belongs to K
(by convexity) and αi(x)equalsyi in all coordinates but i’s, which we increase
until reaching the boundary of V (N).
31Also, because of the smoothness of property (A.2) the functions αi are con-









αi(x) ∈ K for each











We deﬁne a(N,i)=αi (a(N)) for each i ∈ N.I t i s t r i v i a l t o s e e t h a t
(a(N,i))i∈N satisﬁes (C.1), (C.2’), and (C.3). By Proposition 2, (a(N,i))i∈N
also satisﬁes (C.2).￿
5.8 Proof of Theorem 14
By Berganti˜ nos and Vidal-Puga (2002), it is enough to prove that a =( a(S))S⊂N
satisﬁes (B.1), (B.2), and (B.3). By Corollary 10, aρ(S,i) → a(S) for any
i ∈ S ⊂ N.S i n c eaρ(S,i) ∈ ∂V (S)f o re v e r yS ⊂ N and every ρ ∈ [0,1), and
∂V (S) is closed, we conclude that a(S) ∈ ∂V (S) for every S ⊂ N.T h u s ,a sat-
isﬁes property (B.1) of the characterization of the consistent coalitional payoﬀ
conﬁguration.
Let λS be the unit length normal to ∂V (S)a ta(S)f o re a c hS ⊂ N.W e
associate to each ρ a hyperplane game with coalition structure (N,Vρ,C)a s
follows:
Given ρ ∈ [0,1) and S ⊂ N with |S|elements, there exists at least one
hyperplane on RS containing the |S| points {aρ(S,i):i ∈ S}. If there are more
than one hyperplane, we take the one whose unit length outward orthogonal




x ∈ RS : λS (ρ) · x ≤ λS (ρ) · aρ (S,i),i∈ S
ª
.
The half-space Vρ (S)i sw e l ld e ﬁned because λS (ρ) · aρ (S,i)=λS (ρ) ·
aρ (S,j) for all i,j ∈ S.
By Corollary 10, aρ(S,i) → a(S). By the smoothness of ∂V (S), λS(ρ) → λS.
Therefore,
Vρ(S) → V 0(S): =
©
x ∈ RS : λS · x ≤ λS · a(S)
ª
.
By Proposition 7, the proposals {aρ(S,i):S ⊂ N,i ∈ S} satisfy (C.1), (C.2),
and (C.3) for (N,V,C). But these properties are the same for (N,Vρ,C). Thus,
by Proposition 7, aρ is an equilibrium payoﬀ conﬁguration for (N,Vρ,C). By
Theorem 12, this implies that aρ is the only consistent coalitional payoﬀ conﬁg-
uration for (N,Vρ,C).
Hence, each aρ satisﬁes properties (B.1), (B.2), and (B.3) for vectors (λS (ρ))S⊂N.
Given S ⊂ N, x := (xS)S⊂N ∈ R2
S
(with x∅ =0 ) ,µ := (µS)S⊂N ∈ R2
S
(with
32µ∅ =0 ) ,a n di ∈ C0



























































































These functions are continuous. Thus, F−1(0) := {(x,µ):F(x,µ)=
0} is a closed set. Since (aρ,λρ)s a t i s ﬁes (B.2) and (B.3) we conclude that
F1 (S,aρ,λρ)=0a n dF2 (S,i,aρ,λρ) = 0 for all S ⊂ N and i ∈ C0
q ∈ CS. Then,
(aρ,λρ) ∈ F−1 (0). We know that F−1 ( 0 )i sac l o s e ds e ta n d( aρ,λρ) → (a,λ).
Then, (a,λ) ∈ F−1 (0). So, a satisﬁes (B.2) and (B.3).
Since a satisﬁes (B.1), (B.2), and (B.3), we conclude that this vector is the
consistent coalitional value of the hyperplane game (N,V 0,C). Now it is easy
to conclude (by the deﬁnition of Φ)t h a ta is a consistent coalitional payoﬀ
conﬁguration of (N,V,C). Q.E.D.
5.9 Proof of Proposition 17
We proceed by induction on n.F o rn = 1, the result is trivial, because χi
{i} = ri.
Assume the result is true for at most n − 1p l a y e r s .























































































































































































































































































j for all i ∈ N. By (3) and averag-
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